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Abstract: 
We analyze findings from a large-scale survey of around 5000 respondents across 12 states of 
India to study the impact of COVID-19 pandemic containment measures (lockdown) on 
employment, livelihoods, food security and access to relief measures. We find a massive increase 
in unemployment, an equally dramatic fall in earnings among informal workers, large increases in 
food insecurity, depletion of savings and patchy coverage of relief measures. Two-thirds of our 
respondents lost work. The few informal workers who were still employed during the lockdown 
experienced more than a fifty percent drop in their earnings. Even among regular wage workers, 
half received either no salary or reduced salary during the lockdown. Almost eighty percent of 
surveyed households experienced a reduction in their food intake and a similar percentage of urban 
households did not have enough money to pay next month's rent. We also use a set of logistic 
regressions to identify how employment loss and food intake varies with individual and household-
level characteristics. We find that migrants and urban Muslims are significantly worse off with 
respect to employment and food security. Among employment categories, self-employed workers 
were more food secure. The Public Distribution System (PDS) system was seen to have the widest 
reach among social security measures. However, even under PDS, 16 percent of vulnerable urban 
households did not have access to government rations. Further, half of the respondents reported 
not receiving any cash transfers (state or central). We conclude that much more is needed in the 
way of direct fiscal support that has been announced thus far by state and central governments in 
India.  
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Section I: Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 global pandemic and its associated containment measures have taken a heavy 
toll on economies and societies worldwide. In India, the sudden economy-wide lockdown imposed on 
March 24, 2020, lasting until May 31 was one of the largest and most stringent lockdowns in the world. 
The lockdown paused most economic activities and delivered a large aggregate supply and demand 
shock to the economy. The consequences have been unprecedented in scale and intensity, resulting 
in drastic devastation of livelihoods.  
Two long-run structural characteristics of the Indian economy and decades of 
underinvestment in public goods have combined with the sudden and severe lockdown to generate 
widespread misery. First, for India’s predominantly informal labour force, characterised by low 
earnings, insecure jobs, precarious working conditions, absence of social protection, and 
dependence on day-to-day earnings for sustenance, any stoppage of economic activity instantly 
destroys employment and earnings exposing them to large-scale vulnerabilities (ILO, 2018; Chen, 
2012; State of Working India, 2018). Second, the lopsided nature of economic growth has widened 
the economic disparity, both between rich and poor states, as well as within states between the 
urban and rural regions (Economic Survey of India, 2018). This uneven growth process has created 
employment opportunities in larger cities much faster than that in smaller towns and villages. This 
unequal development manifests as migration flows of millions of workers across large distances 
(ibid), creating dense populations of the urban poor. When these long-run factors are put together 
with India’s persistent underinvestment in health, housing and other public services (State of 
Working India, 2019), vulnerabilities to the present crisis become painfully clear. 
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In this paper, we present findings from a survey of 4942 self-employed, casual, and regular 
wage workers across 12 states of India, conducted between April 13 and May 23, 2020. The survey 
was conducted via telephone in collaboration with civil society organisations (CSO) working in 
particular states and communities (see Appendix for a list of states and organisations). We administered 
a detailed questionnaire to respondents engaged in a wide variety of occupations, collecting 
information on their individual and household-level demographics, employment and earnings prior to 
and during the lockdown, and their access to the relief measures.  
 
This survey is one of the few that brings together, on the one hand, a wide geographic coverage 
and, on the other, a detailed exploration of the impact of economic lockdown on livelihoods in India. i 
Our findings are more nuanced in the quantification of these impacts compared to other surveys that 
have evaluated the impact of the lockdown in India. These findings are critical to gauge the impact and 
the efficacy of government policy and relief efforts. 
  
The survey findings suggest a massive increase in unemployment and an equally dramatic fall 
in earnings. Around two-thirds of our respondents lost work during the lockdown, with casual and non-
agricultural self-employed workers being the worst impacted. Using a logistic regression, we find that 
these results are robust to inclusion of individual and household level attributes. The few informal 
workers continued to be employed during the lockdown witnessed their earnings drop by more than 
half, while half of the salaried workers received no salary or a reduction in salaries during the 
lockdown. An overwhelming majority of farmers could either not sell their produce or had to sell at 
lower prices. The crisis also exposed food insecurities, with almost 8 in 10 eating less food than before. 
Further, more than 60 percent of respondents in urban areas did not have enough money for a week’s 
worth of essentials and a third of all respondents had taken a loan to cover expenses during the 
lockdown. We also use a set of logistic regressions to examine how the food intake varies with various 
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demographic attributes and find households relying on wage employment, as well as Muslim and 
migrant households to be particularly likely to experience a reduction in their food intake.   
 
The current relief level, especially direct public spending, does not appear to be in proportion 
to the severity of the situation on the ground since the bulk of the stimulus package focuses on 
increasing liquidity rather than direct spending. We find that even the announced relief measures, 
inadequate as they are, had not reached large sections of the economically vulnerable population. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we present some relevant 
background literature. In Section III we discuss the details of the survey. Section IV describes the 
major findings from the survey focussing on the impact on work and earnings. Section V discusses 
the impact on households and the reach and effectiveness of relief measures. Section VI concludes. 
 
Section II: Background  
 
The pandemic has devastated normal life and led to a massive humanitarian crisis. The 
lockdowns imposed across countries as containment measures has resulted in halting of almost all 
economic activities in most economies across the world and has been described as the biggest 
global economic crisis since the Great Depression (World Bank, 2020). The World Bank forecasts 
that the global gross domestic product (GDP) will contract by 5.2 percent and the developing 
economies will contract by 2.5 percent in 2020. This could potentially result in an increase in 
global poverty for the first time since 1990, pushing 60 to 100 million people into poverty (Lakner 
et. al., 2020; World Bank, 2020). Other research has predicted that in the worst-case scenario about 
half a billion people might be pushed into poverty (Sumner et. al., 2020) and more than 300 million 
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full-time jobs are expected to be lost worldwide in the second quarter of 2020 (International Labour 
Organization, 2020). 
 
The lockdown imposed by the India government in response to the pandemic lasted almost 
two months and was among the most stringent in the world (Hale et.al., 2020). The first lockdown 
was announced on March 24, and was to last until April 14. It was later extended till May 3rd 
which was further extended to May 18th. During this period, all travel, schools, colleges, large 
gatherings and almost all economic activity other than a few essential services were prohibited. 
Limited agricultural activity and transportation of goods were allowed from April 20 in certain 
areas of the country that reported relatively fewer infections.  
 
The strict lockdown has resulted in large scale economic distress and food insecurity as 
large sections of the population experience high vulnerability and subsist on daily earnings without 
any savings to tide them over the halt in economic activity (Ray and Subramanaian, 2020).  The 
first nine weeks of the lockdown has been estimated to cost approximately ₹ 23 trillion (11.5 
percent of GDP) and the Indian economy is predicted to contract by anywhere between 5 to 12.5 
percent in 2020-21 (Sen, 2020).  
 
A range of phone surveys have documented the distress in various parts of the country. ii 
Between 50 to 80 percent of households have reported loss in employment, while those who 
retained employment have seen large declines in earnings. Some studies find that social identities 
such as caste, gender, and religion to be significant determinants of distress.  For example, women 
were far less likely (24 percent) to retain employment than men, and disadvantaged caste groups 
7 
more adversely impacted when compared to higher ranked caste groups (Deshpande, 2020). Later 
in the paper, we also explore the relevance of existing social hierarchies to understand who bears 
the burden of the current crisis. 
 
Further, large scale increase in food insecurity, complete depletion of savings and large-
scale borrowing has been reported in some of the rapid assessments. The government has enhanced 
the social security support during the crisis but only a section of the respondents have received the 
support and the coverage of various schemes that were announced have been inadequate (Afridi et 
al., 2020;  Totapally et. al., 2020; Indus Action, 2020;  VikasAnvesh, 2020).  
  
Surveys also reported that the migrant workers have been the worst affected. The sudden 
unexpected announcement of the lockdown and closure of all transportation combined with a lack 
of a social safety net resulted in indignities, hardship and even deaths. Migrant helplines across 
the country have reported more than 100,000 distress calls from people stranded at their places of 
work without any food or money to buy basic essentials (Stranded Workers Action Network, 2020; 
Actionaid, 2020; CPI(M)-CITU, 2020). Millions have walked or cycled hundreds of kilometers to 
reach their homes and several suffered casualties and deaths in the process (Gramvaani, 2020; Jan 
Sahas, 2020). Several starvation deaths have been reported from various parts of the country 
(Thejesh, 2020).  
 
Section III: About the survey 
We undertook a series of phone surveys to gauge the impacts of the lockdown on the 
livelihoods of India’s workforce. Given the limitations on mobility and keeping in line with the 
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physical distancing norms, all surveys were conducted telephonically. Following a set of questions 
on the demographic profile of the respondents and their households (age, gender, education, 
region, the main source of income, and household size), the survey instrument was divided into 
three broad sections. The first section surveyed respondent’s primary work activity and earnings, 
before the lockdown (February was the reference month) and after the lockdown began (March 
24th till survey date). The second section of the questionnaire examined household level impacts 
on financial and food security. Finally, the last section of the survey explored to what extent the 
existing social security nets as well as newly announced relief measures helped mitigate the impact 
of the crisis. On an average, each survey took fifteen minutes to administer.  
Sampling 
 
The sample of respondents in this study is purposive and non-random. We collaborated 
with nine civil society organisations (CSOs) across the country, engaged in a wide variety of 
activities across twelve large states in India,  to reach out to about 5000 workers.iii Given the 
lockdown, we were unable to do a household listing of the areas where the survey was conducted. iv 
Therefore, in order to identify the respondents for the survey, we relied on the phone databases of 
communities that these CSOs operate with.  While random digit dialing is an often employed 
sampling strategy, given our focus on vulnerable communities who worked in the informal sector 
that are more likely to be severely affected by the lockdown, we decided against random digit 
dialing (RDD). RDD does not offer the flexibility to focus on only one segment of the population. 
Additionally, the response rates for RDD’s are between 15 to 30 percent as compared to around 
60 to 70 percent response rates that we expected (and achieved) through the CSO databases. The 
low response rates and setting up the RDD mechanism meant it would have taken a longer time to 
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execute the survey. Even though using the CSO database makes our sample non-random, we 
ensure that the sample is geographically and occupationally diverse.  Overall, our respondents 
were from 161 different districts across the 12 states in India and were involved in more than 50 
different types of work.  
 
The CSOs we collaborated with work with different types of vulnerable communities. 
These communities include women self-help groups, MGNREGA workers, farmers cultivating 
their own land, landless agricultural workers, tribals, urban poor, migrant workers and other 
marginalized groups.  We employed two sampling strategies based on the organizations’ database 
and capacity during the pandemic. Some organizations had an extensive database of households 
in the communities they worked with and for them, we randomly selected respondents from this 
database. For example, Pradan randomly selected respondents from the existing database of 
households in the districts they operated. Pradan conducted the survey in 120 rural blocks in 25 
districts in three states (Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha). For selecting respondents in 
these three states, five villages in each block where Pradan operates were randomly selected. 
Households from these villages were randomly selected from the list of households the 
organization had in its records. We used this strategy for five organizations.  
 
In cases where CSOs lacked a database of phone numbers, we employed a different 
sampling strategy. The CSOs created a purposive sample of respondents that were geographically 
and occupationally diverse. For example, the Center for Action and Research (CFAR) used their 
community workers and key informants in the communities to create a phone database of over 
2000 households that spanned across six large metropolitan citiesv and included between 30 to 200 
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respondents from 25 different informal occupation categories. The number of selected respondents 
in each occupation category was proportional to the number of people working in that occupation 
in the organization's phone database. These selected respondents included sanitation workers, rag 
pickers, sex workers, domestic workers, construction workers, plumbers, carpenters, tailors, auto 
drivers, security guards, street vendors, garment factory workers, artisans, home-based workers 
and several other urban service providers. We used this sampling strategy for four CSOs.  
  
Given the purposive nature of sampling, the findings presented here pertain only to the 
sample and are not representative of the larger population. The estimates are unweighted. But we 
have a geographically and occupationally diverse sample. The appendix presents the distribution 
of our sample across the major states. This is one of the largest COVID-19 surveys in India 
covering the impact of livelihoods and access to relief measures. Thus our results are likely to be 
indicative of how informal rural and urban workers in India, who constitute nearly 90% of the 
workforce, were impacted by the resultant lockdown.  
 
The survey was administered by trained CSO staff from April 15th to May 15th. This 
period corresponds to the second lockdown which was a complete lockdown across the country. 
Each CSO usually conducted the survey over 7 to 10 days but over different time frames. The 
survey questionnaire was translated into six regional languages and we used SurveyCTO mobile 
application to collect data. All enumerators were trained via video-conferencing and online groups 
were created to provide support to enumerators.  We compensated respondents for their time with 
a payment of ₹ 200 which was paid either via a phone recharge or transfer to their bank accounts. 
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The provision of this compensation was indicated only at the end of the interview and hence was 
not an incentive for participation per se. 
 
Sample Statistics 
Overall our sample is made up of vulnerable households from marginalized communities 
who mostly work in the informal sector of the economy. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the sample. We interviewed 4942 respondents out of which 53 percent were women and the 
average age of the respondents was 38 years. A third of the respondents were illiterate and the 
majority had not completed 10th grade in both rural and urban areas. About 6 in 10 respondents 
(58 percent) were the main income earners of the household. More than 8 in 10 male respondents 
(82 percent) were the main income earners of the household while only 36 percent of female 
respondents were the main income earners of the household (data not shown in Table). A quarter 
of all respondents in urban areas were migrants - 10 percent were migrants working in a different 
district than their native district in the same state (intra-state migrants) and 15 percent were 
working in a different state than their native state (inter-state migrants). About half of the 
respondents in Delhi were migrants with most of them being inter-state migrants. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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Table 1: Sample statistics  
 Rural Urban Total 
Sex (%)     
Male 47 45 46 
Female 53 53 53 
Average age (years) 38.4 38.3 38.3 
Currently married (%) 82 76 79 
Education (%)     
Not literate 36 29 33 
Primary (up to 5th Std) 14 19 16 
Middle (up to 7th Std) 15 18 16 
Secondary (up to 10th Std) 18 19 19 
Higher Secondary (up to 12th Std) 9 7 8 
Degree/Diploma 9 8 8 
Main income earner of the household (%) 52 65 58 
Migrant (%)    
Not a migrant 90 75 84 
Intra-state migrant 8 10 9 
Inter-state migrant 2 15 7 
Region (%) 58 42 100 
Caste (%)    
SC 20 42 29 
ST 32 8 23 
OBC 35 27 32 
General 13 22 17 
Religion (%)    
Hindu 85 84 85 
Muslim 5 12 8 
Others 10 4 8 
Average household size 5.4 5.1 5.3 
Main income source of the household (%)    
Self-employment in agriculture 45 2 27 
Self-employment in non-agriculture 6 8 7 
Regular wage/salary  12 43 25 
Casual labour in agriculture 17 2 11 
Casual labour in non-agriculture  14 22 17 
Other 5 22 12 
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Table 1: Sample statistics (continued) 
 Rural Urban Total 
Household income (₹) in February (%)    
Less than ₹2,000 26 8 18 
₹2,000 to ₹5,000 38 28 33 
₹5,000 to ₹10,000 24 42 32 
₹10,000 to ₹20,000 10 17 13 
More than ₹20,000 3 5 4 
N 2850 2084 4934 
 
About six in ten respondents (58 percent) were from rural areas. About one in three 
respondents were scheduled caste, a similar proportion was from other backward caste and 23 
percent were scheduled tribes. The proportion of scheduled tribes in rural areas is more since the 
rural districts in Jharkhand, Odisha and Madhya Pradesh where respondents were interviewed have 
a high proportion of tribals. The proportion of scheduled caste in urban areas is higher than the 
national average. This is because our urban CSOs worked with sanitation workers and rag pickers, 
and these groups tend to be dominated by scheduled castes. 85 percent of all respondents were 
Hindus, and 8 percent each were Muslims and other religions. The main source of income for 
households in rural areas was agriculture and in urban areas, monthly wage employment was the 
main source of household income. More than eight in ten households in the sample had an income 
of ₹ 10,000 or less in February. Urban households on average had higher incomes than rural 
households.  
 
Table 2 shows how baseline household income categories were distributed across the 
various identity groups. Women respondents came from households that had lower incomes. More 
educated respondents were from households that had higher incomes. Scheduled Tribe households 
were among the poorest, especially in rural areas. Casual workers, particularly in agriculture, were 
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among the poorest groups. Migrants, particularly inter-state migrants, had higher monthly incomes 
in February as compared to non-migrant households.  
 
Table 2: Household income (₹) by identity (%) 
 Rural Urban 
 
Less than 
₹2000 
₹2000 to 
₹10000 >₹10000 
Less than 
₹2000 
₹2000 to 
₹10000 >₹10000 
Sex       
Male 19 62 19 6 61 33 
Female 32 60 8 9 79 11 
Education       
10th Grade or below 28 62 10 8 74 17 
11th and 12th Grade 17 60 23 6 61 34 
Degree/Diploma 8 59 34 5 35 59 
Caste       
SC 21 69 10 9 75 17 
ST 35 55 9 12 69 18 
OBC 20 65 14 8 67 25 
General 23 56 21 8 62 31 
Religion       
Hindu 24 63 13 8 70 22 
Muslim 29 50 21 8 70 23 
Other 29 57 13 7 73 20 
Main income source of household        
Self-employment in agriculture 30 57 13 10 45 45 
Self- employment in non- 
agriculture 19 60 21 8 57 35 
Regular wage/salaried 14 61 24 6 70 24 
Casual labour in agriculture 27 68 4 13 76 11 
Casual labour in non-agriculture 24 64 12 7 72 22 
Other 21 66 12 11 77 12 
Migrant        
Not a migrant 26 63 11 9 74 18 
Intra-state migrant 36 49 15 10 69 21 
Inter-state migrant 8 52 40 4 60 36 
Total 26 62 12 8 72 20 
N 644 1522 289 154 1370 389 
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We identified workers in terms of four types of activities - self-employed workers operating 
their own farm or business; casual wage workers paid on a weekly or daily basis; regular salaried 
workers who received a fixed monthly payment, and unpaid family labour working on family 
enterprises. These categories are the same as those used by the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO). The profile of male and female workers in rural and urban areas is shown 
in Table 3. In rural areas, women were primarily engaged in agricultural work as farmers (35 
percent) or casual wage workers (18 percent). About 25 percent of rural women were engaged in 
casual non-agricultural wage work. In urban areas, 40 percent of women respondents were engaged 
as salaried workers in jobs that provide a regular monthly pay or stipend (including working as 
domestic helpers, garment factory workers). Among men in rural areas, 42 percent were employed 
in casual wage work and 30 percent were working as farmers. In urban areas, nearly half of the 
male respondents were casual daily wage workers (48 percent) in construction and services sectors 
and around 31 percent worked in salaried jobs, while another 16 percent were self-employed.  
 
Table 3: Pre-lockdown work status by region and sex (%)    
 Rural Urban 
 Male Female Male  Female 
Self-employed in agriculture 30 35 1 0 
Self-employed in non-agriculture 10 6 15 15 
Regular wage/salaried 11 8 31 40 
Casual workers in agriculture 16 18 1 0 
Casual workers in non-agriculture 26 25 48 39 
Unemployed 5 4 3 3 
Out of labour force 2 4 1 3 
N  1330 1513 932 1108 
 
We note that even among the salaried workers, the nature of employment was precarious and 
vulnerable. Regular salaried work is only regular to the extent that workers were assured of the 
monthly payment that was due to them at the end of the month. But most such work often had no 
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security, no fixed employer, and could be terminated at any point. Thus, as stated earlier, our 
sample mainly consists of informal workers.  
Section IV: Impact on employment and earnings  
Employment loss 
Given the predominance of informal production and labour relations in the Indian economy 
(and particularly so in this sample), a cessation of all economic activity is likely to have severe 
impacts on employment and earnings. In this subsection, we quantify the extent of  this impact 
using the information on workers’ activities and earnings prior to and during the lockdown.  
We start by noting that the unemployment rate, as usually defined, is not an appropriate 
measure under these circumstances. First, self-employed workers, despite suffering a shock in their 
earnings and work, might continue to identify themselves as self-employed (and therefore in the 
workforce) even if they do not work for even a single day during this period. Second, individuals 
losing jobs (particularly women) may report themselves as engaged in domestic responsibilities in 
the immediate aftermath, rather than as actively seeking employment (and hence unemployed). 
Therefore, in our measure we  quantify employment loss as the share of workers who were in the  
workforce in the month of February, but reported as being either unemployed, out of the labour 
force (e.g. in domestic work) or not having worked for even a single day during this period. Regular 
salaried workers who did not work during this period but received   salaries were counted as being 
employed.  
Using this understanding of employment loss, we find that around two-thirds (sixty-six 
percent) of the workforce in our sample lost employment during the lockdown, with the impact 
being more severe in urban areas. Excluding farmers, around three-fourth of workers (self-
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employed as well as wage) suffered a loss in employment. Those self-employed in agriculture 
were the least affected, while the urban self-employed were the worst affected with nearly 90 
percent of respondents reporting loss of employment (Figure 1).   
  
 
 
Next, we report loss of employment for various social identities and groups (Table 4). 
Women report higher loss of employment relative to men. While this is in line with our prior 
expectations given higher levels of informality and vulnerability among women workers, the effect 
for caste is not along the expected lines. A higher proportion of lower caste groups [Scheduled 
Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Class (OBC)] reported working during 
the lockdown than upper castes. A possible reason for this is that the majority of our respondents 
come from households earning less than ₹ 20,000 a month, indicating that forward caste 
households, which are more likely to belong to the upper income class and with formal jobs, are 
not a significant part of the sample. Further, lower caste groups may tend to work in occupations 
such as sanitation work or other casual work that were required to function to an extent during the 
N=4529 
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lockdown. Furthermore, Muslim respondents were also more likely to have lost work (84 percent) 
compared to Hindus (66 percent). As expected, those with lesser education as well as migrants 
were more likely to lose work. We also find that apart from the agricultural sector, employment 
loss is lowest among sectors that were essential or those associated with more formal employment 
types, such as health and public administration. 
Table 4: Loss of employment by social identities and groups (%) 
 Rural Urban Total 
Sex    
Male 54 78 64 
Female 58 81 68 
Caste    
SC 61 78 71 
ST 55 78 58 
OBC 51 76 60 
General 64 85 76 
Religion    
Hindu 56 80 66 
Muslim 75 89 84 
Others 55 62 56 
Education    
10th Std or below 57 82 68 
11th Std or 12th Std 55 79 63 
Degree/Diploma 55 74 62 
Migrant 72 84 80 
Household income (₹) in February     
Below ₹2,000 61 83 66 
₹2,000 to ₹10,000 56 81 68 
More than ₹10,000 55 74 66 
Sector    
Agriculture 49  49 
Manufacturing 67 89 80 
Construction 77 85 82 
Public Administration, Education and Health 40 37 39 
Other Services 64 80 75 
N 2590 1938 4528 
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Effects of the lockdown have been particularly severe on India’s migrant workers. The 
crisis exposed the vulnerable conditions under which migrants live and work, their lack of access 
to social protection programmes and the paucity of official information on their numbers (Stranded 
Workers Action Network, 2020). Three-fourth of all migrants had been working in non-native 
districts for more than a year (Table 5). Urban and intra-state migrants were more likely to be long 
term migrants than rural and inter-state migrants. Intra-state migrants were far more likely to have 
returned to their native place when we interviewed them as compared to inter-state migrants (55 
percent versus 21 percent). A third of inter-state migrants were unable to return home due to the 
lockdown. At the time of the interview, about seven in ten migrants wanted to return to the place 
of work after the lockdown was lifted either immediately or after a few months, exposing the lack 
of employment opportunities in their native places. The views on whether to return to work in 
destination districts are likely to change as the pandemic and lockdowns continue.  
 
Table 5: Characteristics of migrant workers (%) 
 Intra-state migrants Inter-state migrants 
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Duration of work       
Less than a year 33 16 25 58 20 25 
More than a year 67 84 75 42 80 75 
Plans on returning home       
Returned or on my way 75 32 55 44 18 21 
Could not return 16 24 20 40 33 34 
Not planning to go back 8 44 26 16 50 45 
Plans on returning back to work       
Yes will return 71 56 67 50 76 69 
No, will not return 14 11 13 28 8 13 
I do not know 15 33 20 22 16 18 
Lost Employment 68 82 75 92 85 86 
N 226 43 269 207 280 487 
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The above descriptive analysis points to differential effects of social identity on 
employment loss. To further explore some of the relations we observed above, here we estimate a 
multivariate logistic regression model using maximum likelihood estimation to understand how 
employment loss varies with individual characteristics. The dependent variable takes the value of 
1 if an individual continued to work during the lockdown and 0 if they did not work. We regress 
this variable on individual attributes including the nature of work they are engaged in (self-
employed, casual wage or regular salaried), the sector of employment, their gender, education, 
religious and caste identity. We also include a categorical variable on household income in the 
month of February as a control. Since the profile of our sample varies and the sampling strategy 
might vary by state we employ state fixed effects to account for these differences. We have 
separate regressions for rural and urban areas as the impact is likely to vary by region.  
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions. All estimates are reported in terms of the 
odds ratio. For a categorical independent variable, an odds ratio of greater than 1 implies that 
compared to the base category, the non-base category is more likely to continue in employment 
and an odds ratio less than one implies the opposite.   
We find that, in the rural areas, on an average, casual wage workers were significantly less 
likely to continue in employment compared to the rural self-employed.  This self-employed 
category largely comprises farmers, who were significantly less likely to experience employment 
loss compared to workers in constructions or in trade, hotels and transportation industries. This 
effect, at least in the short-term, is not surprising since farmers are likely to continue farming their 
own land and are less likely to report employment loss despite the lockdown. In the medium and 
long term, this effect might change if farmers are unable to continue farming due to constraints in 
access to raw materials and labour.  
21 
 
In urban areas, regular salaried and casual wage workers are significantly more likely to 
continue in employment, compared to the self-employed. Therefore, the urban self-employed 
consisting largely of petty shopkeepers, street vendors, drivers, and small business owners are 
hardest hit compared to the wage workers in these areas. In terms of sector of employment, on an 
average, in urban areas, those employed in the public service, education and health sectors are 
significantly much more likely to continue working relative to those in the manufacturing sector. 
It is likely that these sectors also comprised some essential services that continued functioning in 
urban areas despite the lockdown.   
 
In terms of the social identities of workers, we find that rural women were significantly 
more likely to experience loss of employment compared to men, supporting what we observed in 
the descriptive statistics. Similarly, as we noted in the descriptive statistics, we find that even after 
controlling for other characteristics, individuals from marginalized communities, on an average, 
were more likely to continue in employment. In terms of religious identity, while the likelihood of 
employment loss for rural Muslims was not significantly different compared to Hindus, Muslims 
were significantly more likely to lose employment relative to Hindus in the urban areas. In both 
rural and urban areas, migrant workers were more likely to experience loss in employment. This 
possibly indicates a higher vulnerability in their occupations as well as their exit from these jobs 
in their efforts to return to their native places. Finally, we find a significant income effect in rural 
areas, where individuals from households with higher levels of income (prior to the lockdown) 
were more likely to continue in employment.vi  
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Estimates of Employment Status (Odds ratio) 
 Rural Urban 
Activity Status (Base: Self-employed)   
Regular salaried 0.925 2.137*** 
 (0.188) (0.532) 
Casual wage  0.495*** 1.533* 
 (0.0569) (0.391) 
Sector (Base: Agriculture (rural); Manufacturing (urban))     
Manufacturing  0.731  
 (0.201)  
Construction 0.383*** 0.824 
 (0.0688) (0.305) 
Health, Education & Public service 1.602 17.34*** 
 (0.485) (8.145) 
Other Services 0.439*** 1.958** 
 (0.0624) (0.634) 
Sex (Base: Male)   
Female  0.757*** 0.892 
 (0.0816) (0.146) 
Social Caste (Base: General)   
SC 1.443** 1.497* 
 (0.268) (0.336) 
ST 2.010*** 1.796* 
 (0.386) (0.573) 
OBC 1.599*** 1.759** 
 (0.273) (0.407) 
Education (Base: Below higher secondary)   
Higher secondary 1.163 0.772 
 (0.203) (0.235) 
Degree/Diploma 0.915 1.158 
 (0.172) (0.360) 
Religion (Base: Hindu)   
Muslim 0.799 0.586* 
 (0.258) (0.174) 
Others 1.015 8.987*** 
 (0.177) (3.554) 
Household income category (Base: Below ₹2,000)    
Between ₹2,000- ₹10,000 1.431*** 1.202 
 (0.168) (0.343) 
Above ₹10,000 1.449** 1.711 
 (0.266) (0.561) 
Migrant Status (Base: Non migrant)   
Migrant worker 0.739* 0.507*** 
 (0.131) (0.104) 
   
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Table 6 (continued)   
 Rural Urban 
Constant .969 .105 
 (.2285) (0.609) 
Observations 2116 1437 
Likelihood Ratio chi-squared 324.44 224.36 
Prob>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses, *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an individual continued to work during the lockdown and 0 if they did 
not work. 
Earnings loss 
The foregoing numbers on loss of employment clearly point to a large negative income 
shock in our sample. We now investigate the impact on the intensive margin for non-agricultural  
self-employed and casual workers who continued to remain employed (Table 7).vii Across 
employment types and social identities, earnings fell by an enormous margin of 40 to 50 percent. 
Notably, 48 percent of the regular salaried workers reported either not having received any salary 
or a reduced salary during the lockdown period.  
Table 7: Change in earnings for those still employed during the lockdown (%) 
 Rural Urban Total 
Sex    
Male -43 -44 -44 
Female -55 -15 -44 
Caste    
SC -50 -29 -39 
ST -56 -44 -55 
OBC -51 -24 -47 
General -28 -62 -27 
Religion    
Hindu -52 -25 -45 
Muslim 28 -45 6 
Others -55 -56 -56 
Status    
Self-employed in non-agriculture -63 -41 -54 
Casual worker -43 -30 -37 
N 229 99 328 
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Figure 2 compares weekly earnings for the month of February with weekly earnings during 
the lockdown for non-agricultural self-employed and casual wage workers. For clarity, the sample 
here has been restricted to those earning up to ₹ 10,000 per month pre-lockdown. Given that, 
barring a few outliers, all points on the scatter plot lie below the line of unity, it is evident that 
earnings have declined for the vast majority of workers who continued to work during the 
lockdown. We also find that the drop in earnings was experienced by workers across income levels.  
Figure 2: Weekly earnings for self-employed and casual workers, prior to and during the lockdown 
 
For casual workers who continued to be employed during the lockdown, this drop in 
earnings is partly a result of decreased availability of work and partly a fall in the wage rate. The 
median number of days worked per week fell from 3.75 to 1.8 (mean fell from 3.7 to 2.3), while 
the median wage rate fell by ₹ 50 (a mean fall of ₹ 80).    
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While we did not collect earnings information from respondents who were self-employed 
in agriculture and allied activities, we asked them about difficulty in selling produce. About 6 in 
10 respondents in agriculture and allied sectors had some produce to sell during the lockdown.  
Among those who had produce to sell an overwhelming majority (85 percent) could not harvest or 
sell or had to sell at a reduced price. The major reasons for not being able to sell were lack of 
transportation and lack of buyers and major reason for not being able to harvest was lack of 
machines or labor. The median amount they were expecting from selling the produce was ₹ 5000. 
Three-fourth of farmers who sold their produce at reduced prices (40 percent of all farmers with 
produce) reported selling it at less than half of the normal prices.  
Taken together, our findings reveal that employment and income loss are experienced 
across all employment categories, for men and women. Our results find resonance with what has been 
observed by other surveys that have studied the economic impact of COVID-19. The hardest hit were the 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) households with 91 percent reporting a loss in livelihood.viii The first round of 
the Dalberg study across ten states revealed that 28 percent of the respondents expected a 100 percent loss 
of income and 45 percent of respondents expected at least a 75 percent loss in income post the lockdown 
(Totapally et al, 2020). 
In fact, regular salaried work in India, which is seen to be relatively more secure has also 
experienced massive loss of employment and earnings, indicating the extent of precarity in the 
Indian workforce. Further, there has also been an increased informalisation and proliferation of 
third-party contract work even with the formal manufacturing and services sectors, making the 
employment arrangements even more tenuous and vulnerable. This informalisation of the formal 
sector has resulted in an increase in the proportion of regular salaried workers with low job security 
in the past two decades (State of Working India, 2018; Bhattacharya et al, 2013). The crisis 
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therefore acts along this fault line of informality and has the effect of levelling-down of livelihoods 
across the board. This is also reflected in the apparent similarity in the relative impacts across men 
and women, types of workers, sectors as well as regions.  
Section V: Impact on households  
Money to buy essentials, food intake, and borrowing 
The economic disruption from such a crisis is likely to have far-reaching consequences for 
households and workers beyond the immediate loss of employment and earnings. Low levels of 
earnings, even prior to the crisis, imply that most households have little or no savings and the 
slightest economic shock can expose them to food and consumption insecurity or financial 
indebtedness, or both. We explore this insecurity in terms of three dimensions - impact on food 
intake, availability of money to buy essentials, and borrowings to finance consumption.  
Figure 3: Impact of lockdown on households (%) 
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The vast majority of households reduced their food intake during the lockdown (Figure 3). 
The impact was particularly severe in the urban areas, with around 86 percent of households 
reporting a reduction in their food intake. On another indicator of vulnerability, we find that around 
64 percent of urban households and 35 percent of rural households did not have enough money to 
buy essentials for even a week. As expected, rural and in particular, farmer households are more 
food secure than those involved in other activities (Table 8). While 25 percent of farmer 
households did not having enough money to buy more than a week’s essentials and 66 percent of 
farmer households reported consuming less food than before the lock down far, the corresponding 
percentage among the non-agricultural self-employed, casual workers and even regular wage 
workers is much higher (over 40 percent and 80 percent, respectively).  
Table 8: Impact on households by income levels and identity (%) 
 
Consuming less 
food than before 
Cannot afford a week's 
worth of essentials 
Had to 
take a loan 
Cannot 
pay rent 
Caste     
SC 86 58 43 90 
ST 68 36 22 68 
OBC 77 43 38 79 
General 84 48 40 88 
Religion     
Hindu 79 46 36 84 
Muslim 89 63 49 86 
Others 72 39 24 93 
Migrant status     
Not a migrant 79 45 36 86 
Intra-state migrant 80 58 42 87 
Inter-state migrant 88 64 28 87 
Main income source of the household     
Self-employment in agriculture 66 25 28 62 
Self-employment in non-agriculture 81 44 38 75 
Regular wage/salaried 83 57 37 87 
Casual labour in agriculture 86 42 42 78 
Casual labour in non-agriculture 86 58 40 86 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Consuming less 
food than before 
Cannot afford a week's 
worth of essentials 
Had to 
take a loan 
Cannot 
pay rent 
Other 88 64 39 90 
Household income (₹) in February     
Less than ₹2,000 77 54 35 83 
₹2,000 to ₹10,000 82 50 37 87 
More than ₹10,000 69 34 33 79 
N 4653 4580 4930 923 
 
Note that this does not necessarily indicate greater incomes among farming households. It 
may only point to access to non-market food sources (such as own produce). Further, around 33 
percent of the rural sample and around 41 percent of the urban sample reported having to take 
loans to cover their daily expenses during the lockdown. Here too, wage workers and non-
agricultural self- employed were more likely to resort to loans, compared to farmers. Further, an 
overwhelming majority borrowed from informal sources such as money-lenders or friends and 
families. Only 4 percent of rural and 2 percent of urban households accessed formal financial 
institutions such as banks for loans (data not shown). Lastly, a very large proportion (90 percent) 
of urban respondents reported that they did not have enough money to pay next month’s rent.  
We observe that even among households that reported having adequate money to purchase 
essentials for more than a week, there was a reduction in food intake. This suggests that having 
resources to meet consumption requirements might only be because these consumption 
requirements have already been compromised in the face of the crisis.  
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Table 9: Logistic Regression Estimates of Food Intake (Odds ratio) 
 Rural Urban 
Household’s primary income source (Base: Self-employed in agriculture 
(rural); Self-employed in non-agriculture (urban) 
  
Self-employed in non-agriculture 0.667 - 
 (0.176)  
Regular wage  0.945 0.483*** 
 (0.191) (0.131) 
Casual labour in agriculture 0.717 - 
 (0.149)  
Casual labour in non-agriculture 0.406*** 0.497** 
 (0.0911) (0.141) 
Employment status during lockdown (Base: Continued in employment)   
Lost employment 0.331*** -0.902*** 
 (0.0424) (0.224) 
Gender of household’s principal income earner (Base: Male)    
Female principal income earner 1.083 0.389*** 
     (0.164) (0.0924) 
Social caste (Base: General)   
SC 1.066 1.200 
 (0.302) (0.341) 
ST 1.670* 1.359 
 (0.458) (0.549) 
OBC 1.513 1.273 
 (0.391) (0.358) 
Religion (Base: Hindu)   
Muslim 0.938 0.525* 
 (0.421) (0.183) 
Religion: Others 0.781 1.364 
 (0.165) (0.713) 
Household income category (Base: Below ₹2,000)   
Between ₹2,000 - ₹10,000 1.025 1.080 
 (0.155) (0.408) 
Above  ₹10,000 2.065*** 3.134*** 
 (0.451) (1.284) 
Migrant status (Base: Non migrant)   
Migrant worker 0.913 0.507*** 
 (0.201) (0.133) 
Access to rations (Base: Procured rations)   
Unable to get ration 0.754 0.798 
 (0.175) (0.227) 
Did not try to get ration 1.783** 1.964** 
 (0.461) (0.642) 
Receipt of cash transfers (Base: Did not receive any transfer)   
Received at least one transfer 1.017 1.375 
 (0.131) (0.282) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Table 9 (continued)   
 Rural Urban 
   
Constant 0.470** .149*** 
 (0.162) (0.104) 
Observations 1721 1156 
Likelihood Ratio chi-squared (21) 376 121.15 
Prob>chi-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses, *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The dependent variable takes 
the value 1 if the household continues to consume the same amount of food as before the lockdown and 0 if the 
household experiences a reduction in the food intake. 
 
In order to further explore how the food insecurity varies with the household-level 
characteristics, we estimate a logistic regression model. We regress the household-level 
characteristics on a binary response variable which takes the value 1 if the household continues to 
consume the same amount of food as before the lockdown and 0 if the household experiences a 
reduction in the food intake. The set of household-level characteristics include primary source of 
income of the household, work status indicating whether the respondent continued to work during 
the lockdown or not, gender of the principle income earner of the household, caste and religious 
identity of the household, household income, whether the household is migrant worker household, 
whether the household was able to access ration support, whether the household received an 
income transfer from the household. We estimate the regression using a maximum likelihood logit 
estimation. We run this regression separately for rural and urban regions. The results of the 
regression are reported as odds ratios in Table 9.  
First, we find that in the urban areas, households that depend primarily on regular wage 
and casual wage employment are significantly more likely than those dependent on self-
employment to experience a reduction in their food intake during the lockdown. It is interesting to 
note that even though self-employed workers in the urban areas are most likely to lose employment 
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during the lockdown, they are better off in terms of food security. In rural areas, households that 
depend primarily on casual wage employment in the agricultural sector are significantly more 
likely than households that depend on self-employment in the agricultural sector to experience a 
reduction in their food intake.  
While there is no significant difference across caste groups, ST households in rural areas 
are more likely to continue with pre-lockdown consumption levels than the general caste 
households. In terms of the religious identity, Muslim in urban areas are significantly more likely 
to reduce their food intake relative to the Hindu households. This is in line with findings from 
other literature that highlights the higher poverty and economic vulnerability experienced by 
Muslims in India (Duraisamy and Duraisamy, 2017). 
In this exercise, we also add the variable that captures a household's access to ration and 
income support. While our descriptive analysis suggests that ration and income support appears to 
be correlated with the food intake, the effect, even though along expected lines, is not significant 
once we control for the other variables in the regression. 
Section VI: Relief measures 
In response to the tremendous shock that the lockdown had on India’s labouring poor, 
governments, at the Central and state levels, announced a series of relief measuresix.  These 
schemes either took the form of direct cash transfers to individuals with prior membership in 
existing schemes, or provision of in-kind support including rations of grains and pulses, or cooked 
meals in feeding centres across certain parts of the country. In this section, we examine access to 
these schemes in our sample and their effectiveness in dealing with vulnerabilities in the labour 
market. We find that while the crisis has affected almost all sections of the lower echelons of 
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society in similar ways, the reach and effectiveness of relief schemes and the access to these 
measures have not been neutral, with certain kinds of households having an advantage in accessing 
schemes and relief measures. 
We specifically look at the reach and efficacy of four different measures that the 
government used as interventions to address the crisis. For the provision of in-kind support, the 
government relied on one of the largest social security nets available in the country - the Public 
Distribution System (PDS)x.  The quantity of essentials supplied to eligible households under the 
PDS was increased with the additional quantity being provided for free. Besides the in-kind 
support, the government also announced cash transfers to account holders under various pre-
existing schemes. One such scheme, the PM-KISAN, provides income support to farmers 
(cultivators who own land)xi.  In the wake of the crisis, the government announced the early release 
of payments under this scheme. Cash transfers were also announced for account holders of two 
other schemes - Jan Dhan and widow/pension account holdersxii.  
Figure 4: Access to relief measures for vulnerable households (by region) (%) 
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In our sample, we find that almost 89 percent of rural and 77 percent of urban households 
possessed a ration card needed to access the PDS. Upon excluding migrant workers (who until 
recently were only eligible to access PDS in their state of permanent residence), this rural-urban 
disparity is reduced, with around 84 percent urban non-migrant households having access to ration 
cards. Overall, we found that 11 percent of households were unable to receive rations during the 
lockdown. The performance of rural areas was better than the urban areas (Figure 4).  In terms of 
social groups, scheduled tribe households performed the best in terms of access to these essentials 
(Table 10). Nearly one in five interstate migrants did not receive ration during the crisis. 92 percent 
of the households that earned less than ₹ 2000 in the month of February managed to receive rations 
during the lockdown. 
Table 10: Access to relief measures for vulnerable households by identity and income of household 
(%) 
 
Unable to 
access ration 
Did not 
receive Jan 
Dhan transfer 
Did not 
receive PM-
Kisan transfer 
Did not receive 
pension 
transfer 
Did not 
receive any 
cash transfer  
Caste      
SC 11 68 80 33 54 
ST 7 67 87 31 46 
OBC 11 59 65 37 44 
General 12 70 50 26 56 
Religion      
Hindu 11 66 73 33 49 
Muslim 16 71 60 49 63 
Others 10 71 87 34 56 
Migrant      
Not a migrant 10 66 75 30 49 
Intra-state migrant 10 75 85 47 59 
Inter-state migrant 24 73 50 58 66 
Main income source of household    
Self-employed in 
agriculture 8 59 76 29 38 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Unable to 
access ration 
Did not 
receive Jan 
Dhan transfer 
Did not 
receive PM-
Kisan transfer 
Did not receive 
pension 
transfer 
Did not 
receive any 
cash transfer  
      
Self-employed in 
non-agriculture 12 75 - 26 59 
Regular 
wage/salaried  15 74 - 33 60 
Casual labour in 
agriculture 7 48 - 35 39 
Casual labour in 
non-agriculture  15 68 - 43 55 
Other 12 78 - 37 63 
Household incomes (₹) in February    
Less than ₹2,000 8 65 80 34 44 
₹2,000 to ₹10,000 12 67 73 33 53 
More than ₹10,000 14 74 76 34 57 
N 4600 3448 918 1264 4194 
 
 
Around 31 percent of rural respondents owned land and were eligible to receive cash under 
the PM-KISAN scheme. We found that there was a clear difference in the receipt of transfers by 
caste. Nearly nine in ten scheduled tribe households and eight in ten scheduled caste households 
engaged in farming did not receive the aforementioned installment.  On the other hand, around 
half of the general category farming households did manage to receive the same.  
With respect to the Jan Dhan scheme, a relatively higher percentage of Muslim households 
did not receive any transfer compared to Hindu households. Moreover, a lower share of migrant 
households received this transfer compared to non-migrant households. Households whose main 
source of income was agriculture (whether self-employed or casual agricultural work) were noted 
to be doing relatively better than the other household categories. 
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Close to two-thirds of all eligible pensioners received their pension. Pensioners belonging 
to Muslim households fared worse off here as well with close to half of the pensioners not receiving 
their due pension transfer. Similarly, only 42 percent of inter-state migrants received this transfer. 
In an attempt to capture the overall reach of the aforementioned cash schemes as well as 
that of any other cash transfer schemes announced by the state or central government, we looked 
at the share of households who received at least one cash benefit transfer from the government. 
On the whole we observed that only half of the households received any cash transfer from the 
government. Muslim households were least likely to receive even a single cash transfer compared 
to Hindus and other religious groups. Inter-state migrant households were once again the worst 
performers with two –thirds of such households not receiving any transfer. More than six in ten 
farmer households received at least one transfer, 
Overall our analysis shows that using a universal scheme such as the PDS has the benefit 
of broader scope and of lower exclusion rates. Almost 80 percent of low-income households were 
able to access rations. This is in contrast to the targeted cash transfer schemes which gravely fell 
short of reaching its intended beneficiaries, with about half of vulnerable households not receiving 
even one form of cash transfer. Additionally, the targeted cash transfers have also resulted in the 
exclusion of already marginalised communities from the ambit of these schemes. This has 
implications on the nature of the recovery process. If access to relief measures are unequal, it is 
likely that the recovery from the crisis will also be of a selective nature, favouring certain kinds of 
households over others, and potentially perpetuating existing inequalities.  
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Section VII: Conclusion  
The foregoing results and analysis clearly show a profoundly negative impact of the 
COVID-19 containment measures on the Indian economy. Long-run features such as a delayed 
structural transformation and high levels of informal employment have combined with a severe 
short-run contraction of demand to destroy livelihoods on a large scale. Given precarity and 
absence of social security, any shock to economic production directly translates into a loss of 
employment, a sharp decline in earnings, and aggravation of livelihood insecurities. Low levels of 
earnings and the consequent lack of savings among most households magnify their food insecurity, 
forcing them to compromise on food intake. In our survey, these effects are seen across the board, 
for all work types, sectors, gender, and other identities.  
The purposive nature of the sampling does not allow us to generalise the survey findings 
beyond the sample. Therefore, we do not make any statements regarding the entire economy purely 
on the basis of this survey. However, evidence that is rapidly gathering from several surveys paints 
a similar picture. Further, macroeconomic projections are consistent with very large negative 
effects. According to one estimate, the Indian Economy may contract in 2020-21 by 12.5 percent 
and return to pre-crisis levels of GDP only after several years (Sen, 2020).  
While calls for immediate and large fiscal support measures have emerged from several 
quarters, current levels of fiscal support in India fall well short of what is required. For example, 
we show that incomes have been either wiped out or halved, resulting in lost earnings of several 
thousands of rupees for April and May. But the promised cash transfers (state and Centre 
combined) hardly compensate for this. The low reach and lack of effectiveness of the government 
support make it imperative for migrants to return to work. This is evident for instance from the 
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fact that despite the immense hardships faced in returning home, around 47 percent responded that 
they would immediately return to work-sites post the lockdown.  
Taken together, our findings, together with findings from other surveys point to an urgent 
need for a large fiscal intervention. We hope that they will bring forth a policy response appropriate 
in scale to this unprecedented crisis. 
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Appendix A1 
States 
Covered  Partner Organisations 
Start date of survey 
(MM/DD/YYYY) 
End date of survey 
(MM/DD/YYYY) 
Number of 
respondents 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Samalochana 24-04-2020 05-05-2020 281 
Bihar (Rural) Aga Khan Rural 
Support Programme 
17-04-2020 12-05-2020 184 
Delhi (Urban) Centre For Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR) 
17-04-2020 14-05-2020 243 
Gujarat Self Employed 
Women's Association 
(SEWA) 
15-04-2020 18-05-2020 315 
Jharkhand 
(Rural) 
Pradan 30-04-2020 13-05-2020 464 
Karnataka Centre for Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR), 
Gauri Media Trust 
15-04-2020 15-05-2020 861 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Pradan, Srijan 14-04-2020 23-05-2020 545 
Maharashtra 
(Pune) 
Centre for Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR) 
13-04-2020 22-05-2020 323 
Odisha Centre for Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR), 
Pradan 
22-04-2020 15-05-2020 503 
Rajasthan Centre for Advocacy 
and Research (CFAR), 
VAAGDHARA 
14-04-2020 20-05-2020 484 
Telangana 
(Rural) 
Samalochana 15-04-2020 09-05-2020 329 
West Bengal 
(Rural) 
Paschim Banga Khet 
Majoor Samiti 
29-04-2020 09-05-2020 195 
Other States Azim Premji 
Foundation 
13-04-2020 23-05-2020 212 
Overall  13-04-2020 23-05-2020 4,939xiii 
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Endnotes 
i Findings from the survey have been reported in news media and are available online at 
https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/covid19-analysis-of-impact-and-relief-measures/. Also see Lahoti 
et al (2020) for summary of the findings. 
ii Please see https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/covid19-analysis-of-impact-and-relief-
measures/#other_surveys 
iii The CSO partners include Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, Centre for Advocacy and Research 
(CFAR), Gauri Media Trust, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samiti, Pradan, Samalochana, Self Employed 
Women’s Association, Srijan and Vaagdhara. We worked with field personnel of Azim Premji 
Foundation to pilot the questionnaire as well as conduct final phone surveys in a few states.  
iv We could not use any administrative list such as the list of Public Distribution Scheme (PDS) 
beneficiaries or list of households maintained by Panchayats for different schemes as these lacked phone 
numbers and were not accessible to us during the lockdown.  
v CFAR conducted the survey in Ajmer, Bengaluru, Bhubaneshwar, Delhi, Jaipur and Pune.  
vi We also additionally control for age of the worker and household size in our regression and find that our 
results hold. 
vii Regular salaried workers are not part of this analysis because we did not collect data on their wages 
during the lockdown.  
viii https://theprint.in/india/new-class-of-poor-emerging-after-job-losses-in-lockdown-95-8-bpl-slum-
families-hit-study/433785/ 
ix Detailed information on relief measures is available here: 
https://covid19socialsecurity.wordpress.com/relief-measures/ 
x The PDS forms an integral part of India’s food security infrastructure allowing ration-card holders to 
access subsidised food essentials including grains, pulses, sugar and oil from government-recognised 
shops across the country. PDS, unlike other recent social security schemes, is universal in nature and 
relies on self-selection of individuals to access ration through the PDS shops. 
xi Under this scheme a direct cash transfers of ₹6000 per year in three installments of ₹2000 is given to all 
farmer households. Exclusion criteria are given here: https://pmkisan.gov.in/ 
xii The Jan Dhan scheme, announced as part of the government's financial inclusion programme, extended 
the opportunity of opening a bank account to any citizen. Any woman having a Jan Dhan account was to 
be provided with an immediate transfer of ₹1500 in three equal installments of ₹500 each. Pensioners and 
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widowers who had a government-recognised pensioner/widower account were also eligible for a one time 
transfer of ₹1000. 
xiii The information on states was missing for three observations. 
